

S E C R E T

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Item for Discussion with SecDef

FROM:

DC/PCS

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

10 June 1982

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

C/PCS

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ADDO

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OSD review completed

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asked for this STAT  
and provided some guidelines  
from John McMahon. STAT  
interpretation of STAT  
DCI authorities/responsi-  
bilities has been included as  
requested. These talking  
points are designed to  
sensitize DoD to need for  
improving intelligence  
management within DoD and  
coordination with CIA. Also  
to achieve a greater degree  
of coherence between  
positions to be taken by DoD,  
Army and CIA with the HPSCI  
on 16 June. Army may be harder  
to bring around than DoD  
management.

THIRD PARAGRAPH ON  
PAGE 2 REVISED PER  
DDCI's COMMENTS.

ARMY review(s) completed.

FORM  
1-79

610

USE PREVIOUS  
EDITIONS

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10 June 1982

OSD review completed

Breakfast Item for DCI Discussion with SECDEF

Friday, 11 June 1982

- The DCI's responsibilities and broad authorities to coordinate U.S. intelligence activities abroad (including foreign liaison, clandestine collection and counterintelligence) were updated and reinforced by E.O. 12333. Authority granted to DoD to conduct military intelligence liaison abroad is subject to policies formulated by the DCI. Furthermore, the DCI clearly has the responsibility to coordinate all special activities.
- These authorities and responsibilities of the DCI have been cited by the HPSCI in connection with the Committee's concern that DoD (especially Army ACSI with support from ISA and JSOC) has been conducting uncoordinated liaison with foreign military intelligence counterparts [redacted] 25X1  
[redacted] The Committee's concern is heightened by the perception that these liaison activities are designed to enhance strategic relationships with the concerned countries, ignore restrictions on military assistance and closely parallel the special activities of CIA. As these DoD activities are conducted abroad and with foreign intel services, the Committee holds the DCI responsible for insuring a much greater degree of coordination, consistency and conformance with the law (e.g. restrictions on military assistance).
- The DCI has not been provided by DoD with the information that is needed to coordinate these activities and otherwise fulfill his responsibilities. He is indeed vulnerable to accusations that he is not paying sufficiently close attention to the foreign military liaison activities of DoD or using these activities to bypass restrictions on military assistance or CIA operations.
- Army ACSI maintains that its foreign liaison initiatives in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia are overt and tactical, thus not requiring coordination with CIA. It is our position that foreign military liaison which is conducted at the request of DoD and Army management for the purpose of enhancing larger strategic relationships cannot be considered tactical. Furthermore, the foreign military intel counterparts of ACSI regard this assistance as secret and otherwise closely held. 25X1

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- In his statement and appearance before the Committee on 16 June, the DCI will be expected to deal with this question and to assure the Committee that DoD management has agreed to fully coordinate such activities in the future. The DCI wants to avoid taking a position with the Committee that has not been accepted by DoD or which can be interpreted as indifferent to his responsibilities for coordinating the military's foreign intelligence activities.
- The Committee is also concerned that the clandestine operational support functions of ISA are tantamount to special activities for which the DCI is also responsible. Since no such functions or activities of ISA have been coordinated with CIA, the DCI is vulnerable on this issue as well unless he receives appropriate information and assurances from DoD. It is our impression that, except for [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] no such clandestine support activities have been conducted abroad, but we do not have sufficient information to provide the Committee with the necessary assurances [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] was not coordinated in Washington until after the fact.
- The conventional intelligence collection activities of ISA (i.e., CIOPS) have been duly coordinated with CIA, with the exception [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] HOWEVER, SOME FOREIGN LIAISON/INTELLIGENCE TRAINING ACTIVITIES OF ACSI (WITH PERIPHERAL ISA INVOLVEMENT) WHICH IMPACT ON CIA ACTIVITIES HAVE NOT BEEN PROPERLY COORDINATED. This is attributable, in part, to differences in perception between CIA and DoD as to whether these activities require coordination. We are in the process or re-writing DCID 5/2 (concerning the coordination of foreign liaison activities) in an effort to clarify this point. In sum, the DCI must be kept better informed about military relations with foreign governments in order to determine to what extent these relations require formal consideration.
- It must be assumed that the Committee will also question the DCI on the closely related issues of [REDACTED] JSOC and the recent proliferation within DoD of overlapping collection activities. The questions raised by the HPSCI about ISA cannot be separated from these larger issues and our own concerns about uncoordinated duplication within DoD. CIA's reservations about [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] intention to target Communist and Third-World nationals plus insurgency, international terrorism, etc. derive in large part from the fact that these targets are being pursued aggressively and extensively by CIA and DoD intelligence programs already underway.
- It is important that the DCI be able to assure the HPSCI that internal DoD coordination will be strengthened and [REDACTED] 25X1  
[REDACTED] targetting will be limited to collection in support of military contingency forces.

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